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T 
hroughout his writings, Nietzsche criticizes language 
for what he takes to be its distortions of thought.i The 
social nature of language, he claims, generalizes that 
which, in experience, is particular and thereby flattens 
our individual thoughts to communicable expressions. This is 
part of Nietzsche’s general critique of socialized man; he sees the 
individual as being compromised by the assimilating power of 
social norms, including those of language. He puts this some-
what differently in his powerful essay “On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense,” in which he tells a story of the social origins of 
language and of the arbitrary conceptual framework produced 
by it. In particular, the concept of “truth:” it is one of the most 
powerful social fictions, according to Nietzsche, and is a paradig-
matic case of the distortion of the particular as something gener-
ally conceivable. This account elaborates on his notion of lan-
guage as productive of the illusion of conceptual generalities and 
therefore an aberration of our experience of the fundamentally 
non-conceptual world. that language is derivative of thought and 
fails to accurately capture it in its attempt to communicate it. The 
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notion of truth, of communicated experience, and that of the con-
cept at all, are all subject to criticism by Nietzsche because they 
are share in the fundamental problem with language: it attempt 
to convey a world of particulars through communicable generali-
ties. 
 Nietzsche does, however, go beyond the traditional philo-
sophical deprecation of language as the impoverished expression 
of thought by suggesting that one can preserve the depth of indi-
viduality—of asocial thought and feeling—through language by 
using the conceptual framework for one’s own creativity and self
-discovery. The exemplary instantiation of this use of language is 
the writing of Nietzsche himself. Behind these criticisms directed 
towards language there is the suggestion that one can move be-
yond these problems, that one even needs the usually limiting 
linguistic framework to “play with”—to twist and break its con-
ventions—to be (re)creative of one’s individuality (and though-
tii). Thus while it may seem to be a contradiction to both criticize 
language for its generalization and de-individuation and herald 
a particular use of language as enriching and creative of the indi-
vidual, we will see that the latter analysis of language is predicat-
ed on the fact contained in the former. It is because language can 
only convey a thin version of thought that it can be used to stim-
ulate—even demand—individuation. This will become clearer 
when we look at the relation between Nietzsche’s texts and his 
reader. 
 Before trying to explicate the complex manner in which lan-
guage can be thought of as useful or even necessary to self-
discovery as conveyed in the final section of “On Truth and Lies 
in a Nonmoral Sense,” his critique of language as detrimental to 
our individuality and productive of countless distortions and 
falsehoods which masquerade as truths must first be understood. 
Besides “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” there are at 
least two texts which treat the dissimulation of language explicit-
ly. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche seeks to uncover the develop-
ment both of consciousness and of language, finding the origins 
of both in “the need to communicate,” and seeing them both as 
productive of the same diseases of the individual—or rather, that 
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all that is problematic in consciousness is made manifest in lan-
guage: “the thinking which becomes conscious is only the small-
est part of it, let’s say the shallowest, worst part - for only that 
conscious thinking takes place in words, that is, in communica-
tion symbols.”iii The following passage from this aphorism de-
scribe the inherent problem with conscious thought, which is 
language makes manifest: 
each of us, even with the best will in the world to 
understand ourselves as individually as possible, 
‘to know ourselves’, will always bring to con-
sciousness precisely that in ourselves which is 
‘non-individual’, that which is ‘average’; that due 
to the nature of consciousness - to the ‘genius of 
the species’ governing it - our thoughts them-
selves are continually as it were outvoted and 
translated back into the herd perspective. At bot-
tom, all our actions, are incomparably and utterly 
personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, 
there is no doubt; but as soon as we translate them 
in consciousness, they no longer seem to be [...] 
everything which enters consciousness thereby 
becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a 
sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming conscious 
involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsifica-
tion, superficialization, and generalization.iv 
This translation of our individual thoughts into the conscious 
and communicable realm of society has wide repercussions: Nie-
tzsche attributes the loss of our individuality to the introduction 
of the conscious and the linguistic, a loss which is marked by the 
replacement of the particular with the universal, the deep with 
the shallow, the true with the false, and so on.  
 In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche presents another nega-
tive picture of language, namely “Language as Putative Science”v 
in an aphorism thus named. This aphorism examines language 
not through its relationship to consciousness and our socializa-
tion, but rather as a manmade tool that falsely claims to describe 
the world truthfully (hence “putative science”). Again, Nietzsche 
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tells a brief story of the development of language and how that 
has lead to error:  
The sculptor of language was not so modest as to 
believe that he was only giving things designa-
tions, he conceived rather that with words he was 
expressing supreme knowledge of things [...] A 
great deal later - only now - it dawns on men that 
in their belief in language they have propagated a 
tremendous error.vi 
This aphorism suggests that this error lies in man’s notion that 
his grasp of the world is sufficient to be able to construct a paral-
lel world (in language) that could “make itself master” over the 
world it describes—that is, that the linguistic world could some-
how grasp and even inform our experience of the world. The 
sketch of this thought found in Human, All Too Human, is de-
rived from his earlier essay, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
Sense,” in which this criticism of language is expanded but also 
greatly complicated. 
 In contrast to these two relatively straightforward aphorisms, 
both of which present language simply as a propagator of error, 
“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” paints a more nuanced 
and compelling picture of language and its relation to our 
thought. Nietzsche again uses a genealogy to frame his analysis. 
The essay focuses on the emergence and dominance of the con-
cept “truth,” providing a theory of language that helps to bridge 
the two different criticisms presented above.  
 “The ‘thing in itself’,” Nietzsche tells us, is “something quite 
incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not 
in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the 
relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he 
lays hold of the boldest metaphors.”vii These metaphors, he con-
tinues, are twice removed from what they attempt to describe: 
words are “imitations” of images, which are themselves 
“imitations of nerve stimuli.” Each of these metaphorical transla-
tions maps the original stimulus onto an entirely different sphere 
incapable of preserving the content of the former. That is, just as 
a smell can never be captured by sound, no matter how complex, 
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nerve stimuli are simply not reproducible as images or as 
sounds, and any translation into these latter forms is therefore a 
severe distortion of the former. This idea of something being lost 
in translation into language is prominent in the aphorism in The 
Gay Science mentioned above as well; there is something about 
language that renders it incompatible with our thought, our ex-
perience of particulars. 
 Nietzsche pins this incompatibility on language’s fundamen-
tally conceptual nature: any translation into language is a trans-
lation into concepts. The distortion in this translation then stems 
from the imposition of generalities, or concepts, onto actualities, 
which are particular: Nietzsche posits that “we obtain the con-
cept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and 
actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no con-
cepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which 
remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.”viii Language forces 
dissimilar things into one conceptual unit, he claims, not only 
producing the illusion that they are similar, but that they share 
some underlying essence which makes them what they are; con-
cepts bring with them false essences which lead us to draw the 
conclusion that, for example, those things we call true are true 
because of some truthfulness, some essential quality that makes 
them true. This entirely disguises the fact that its truth is merely 
the product of its being linguistically designated as such. This 
illusion behind the concept of truth applies to everything con-
ceived linguistically. 
 What does this discussion of fictitious universals and linguis-
tic concepts have to do with the criticism leveled in The Gay Sci-
ence; what import does this have on man’s individuality? This 
question is answered by the second section of “On Truth and 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” in which Nietzsche sets up the con-
trast between what he calls the “rational man” and the “intuitive 
man.” 
 This “rational” man is the one who is the subject of On the 
‘genius of the species’, the passage from The Gay Science we 
looked at earlier; he is the one who suffers from a lack of individ-
uality at the hands of his linguistic socialization. The entire edi-
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fice of metaphor in which he lives and thinks is one of 
“averages,” one of generalizations. He expresses himself through 
the language of society (for there is no other kind of language 
available to him), and thereby loses sight of his individuality, his 
uniqueness. It is the same loss described in the case of truth, or of 
any concept: all of these linguistic abstractions of universals from 
particulars constitute the abstraction of the social from the indi-
vidual: man’s sociality is his being bounded by society’s linguis-
tic conventions. It is here that one begins to see where Nietzsche 
might see a way out; that though, generally, language is a medi-
um inclined towards the social, it is its restrictiveness in particu-
lar, its complete obedience to convention, which is problematic. 
 Beyond making the core of his critique of language clear, this 
essay also acknowledges language to now be inseparable from 
man. He rightly rejects the possibility of reverting to a non-
linguistic, asocial state by flatly stating that “the drive toward the 
formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which 
one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one 
would thereby dispense with man himself.”ix Nietzsche therefore 
works to conceive of a way to undo the loss of the individual 
without discarding language altogether. This is what makes the 
essay so interesting: not only does Nietzsche beautifully articu-
late the obstacles inherent to linguistic expression, he also recog-
nizes man’s attachment to language and suggests a way to re-
main faithful to oneself through ‘individual creativity’ (this ra-
ther vague phrase will hopefully become clearer later) while re-
maining a linguistic animal. 
 Nietzsche’s suggestion is as follows: out of the conceptual 
bonds which tie rational man to convention and his sociality, an-
other man (the “intuitive” one) is able to become “creative” by 
bending and breaking those norms of metaphor. This very nie-
tzschean notion of rediscovering—or perhaps simply discover-
ing—oneself by finding a creative mode within or out of the sti-
fling framework responsible for that initial loss of individuality 
is beautifully (though admittedly obscurely) related through his 
description of the intuitive man, the “free intellect”: 
11 
that immense framework and planking of con-
cepts to which the needy man clings his whole life 
long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a 
scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of 
the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this 
framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and 
puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing 
the most alien things and separating the closest, it 
is demonstrating that it has no need of these 
makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be 
guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. 
There is no regular path which leads from these 
intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the 
land of abstractions. There exists no word for 
these intuitions; when man sees them he grows 
dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden meta-
phors and in unheard-of combinations of con-
cepts. He does this so that by shattering and 
mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at 
least correspond creatively to the impression of 
the powerful present intuition.x 
The intuitive man frees himself by shedding his conceptual 
bonds, by de- and reconstructing the metaphorical framework, 
by “playing with seriousness.” But what would it look like to be 
creative in this way, to be playful in the manner just described? I 
would suggest that the best guides to understanding this intui-
tive man are Nietzsche’s writings themselves. 
 As any reader can attest, Nietzsche is conspicuously convo-
luted:xi he purposefully makes himself difficult to understand 
and paraphrase. He writes in metaphor and in parable—his 
prose rarely lends itself to any immediate understanding, what 
we might call poetic prose. We should see this as necessary for 
Nietzsche for two complimentary reasons. The first has to do 
with the production of writing itself: he avoids the dangers of 
language sketched out above for himself. That is, he manages to 
preserve himself in his writing. The second regards its reception: 
his style is meant to produce a philosophical language that will 
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have the pedagogical effect on his readers he extolls in so much 
of his writings. First let us think about the manner in which Nie-
tzsche’s writing style is exemplary of the productions of an intui-
tive man. 
 The intuitive man “speaks only in forbidden metaphors and 
in unheard-of combinations of concepts,” he tells us. One cannot 
help but be reminded of Zarathustra’s bizarre speeches, the 
countless metaphors used in foreign contexts—what one might 
call a linguistic playfulness. His unconventional use of metaphor 
and conjunctions of otherwise entirely disjointed things is a per-
fect demonstration of a certain freedom from the conceptual 
boundaries language generally imposes upon us. There is still 
the question of why it would be that creativity or originality in 
writing should be thought of as personal or individual, why one 
should think that unconventional—and in that sense creative—
usage of language constitutes an expression of individuality. If 
we take Nietzsche’s texts, particularly Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
to be paradigmatic of the intuitive man, the answer to this seems 
clear. 
 The rational man is he who speaks and writes (and therefore 
thinks) using a framework he has adopted, taken from others. He 
is rooted to society’s perspective, not his own, and is therefore 
merely regurgitating that which has been given to him. This is 
the rational aim: to remove the differences that arise from per-
spectives and attain some universal truth or view that is meant to 
be compatible with anyone. But in truth it is compatible with no 
one: though every individual speaks in the same manner and is 
consistent in their language, they are not doing this qua individ-
ual, but rather qua member of society. It is this man to whom 
Nietzsche stands in such stark contrast. If we understand the po-
etic quality of Nietzsche’s writing to be symptomatic of his dedi-
cation to writing as an individual rather than his being obscure 
for the end of not being understood by the common or some oth-
er such motivation, it becomes clear in what manner he stands so 
opposed. 
 The intuitive man uses a form that must be foreign to others, 
it must appear strange and unapproachable; for the language to 
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be Nietzsche’s own, it cannot be entirely ours as well. Hence, 
such convolution is the product (though of course not always 
indicative) of successfully individuated writing, writing which is 
free from the rigid framework that would socialize it and render 
it easily accessible to all readers. Thus, the intuitive man is 
marked by his creative (re)individuation. He is able to preserve 
the individual in a medium that is initially and primarily averag-
ing and social. 
 We see in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” that 
Nietzsche does much more than present two (perhaps even con-
flicting) analyses of language—one distorting, the other enrich-
ing. Rather, the intuitive man’s creative use of language is made 
possible by the degraded nature of the medium. This is clearer in 
the creativity required on the part of the reader than on the part 
of the writer. Beginning in his early essay Schopenhauer as Ed-
ucator and continuing through Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nie-
tzsche impresses over and over that the culmination of education 
lies in the overcoming of the educator, in taking that which one 
has learned from the educator and making it one’s own, and in 
this sense rejecting the teacher and their teachings. At the end of 
the first part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra directs his 
disciples to do precisely this:  
go away from me and resist Zarathustra! And 
even better: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he de-
ceived you. [...] You had not yet sought your-
selves: and you found me. Thus do all believers; 
therefore all faith amounts to so little. Now I bid 
you lose me and find yourselves; and only when 
you have all denied me will I return to you.xii 
This sentiment courses throughout the book and, as I 
said, its earliest expression can already be found in Scho-
penhauer as Educator.xiii 
 I suggest that we take Zarathustra’s relation to his disciples 
to be analogous to the relation Nietzsche would like his readers 
to have to his texts. Zarathustra is a successful educator because 
of his poetic use of language. He does not speak or act in a way 
which can be straightforwardly adopted: both for the obvious 
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reason that nothing he says is clear or consistent enough to be 
treated as direct prescriptive doctrine and because—as illustrat-
ed above—he makes explicit the kind of education he wants to 
foster. His disciples have to form their own individuated re-
sponse to the example set Zarathustra before they can be said to 
be followers of him at all. Similarly, Nietzsche’s style is meant to 
force an engagement with the text which requires the reader to 
read into it, to further determine his meaning; the text’s re-
sistance to being immediately and passively taken on requires 
that the reader interpret the text and thereby make it their own. 
Both Nietzsche and Zarathustra avoid systematic doctrine and 
instead use poetic language to convey their thoughts; not to per-
fectly preserve their individuality in their language, but to 
prompt the interpreter to impose their own individuality onto 
the language. 
 If we return to the notion in the Gay Science which holds that 
linguistic expression is the “flattening” of thought and that this is 
a problem that becomes salient in the context of communication, 
we might think of our experience of actuality, of our individuat-
ed thoughts, as a deep well which is dried up when expressed in 
language. The task is therefore to produce language which de-
mands refilling, re-enrichment. Or, put differently, language 
which prompts the reader to reread, reflect, reject, question—to 
think for themselves—is, though itself impoverished, productive 
of a richness perhaps equal to the original thought behind the 
language. To read in this way is to make language one’s own, to 
take that dried up, derivative reminiscence of—in this case Nie-
tzsche’s—perspective, and give it depth again, restore its individ-
uality. This restoration will have the effect of restoring perspec-
tive of a new kind, since it is now the reader’s thought, not Nie-
tzsche’s. This is precisely why it is an inherently impoverished 
medium that is needed to produce the kind of demand on the 
reader or interlocutor stimulated by both Nietzsche and Zara-
thustra. 
 Presenting the reader with texts that require this re-
enrichment of thought should then be thought of as teaching that 
reader to seek re-individuation through language. It is in this 
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sense that Nietzsche’s unusual metaphors, his bizarre and un-
conventional use of parable and quotation, even his use of punc-
tuation, all function as ways of jarring the reader and thereby 
forcing them to interpret, drawing them out of their rationalist 
passivity and compelling them to intuitively contribute their 
own personal richness to that language. This is the pedagogical 
power of the intuitive man. 
 We see then, that Nietzsche’s sharp denigrations of language 
and its place in obscuring individuality as well as his abstruse 
prose are in the service of arousing our ability and desire to 
move beyond conventional linguistic expression as well as pro-
duce philosophical engagement arising from their individuality, 
not their appropriation of socially prepared concepts. As with so 
much of Nietzsche’s ostensibly negatively charged analysis of 
society, it is motivated entirely by the positive aim of discovering 
and extolling that which is unique to each of us, to shed the so-
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i. “Thought” is meant here to get at the individual’s rich 
experience of the world. A non-linguistic and un-
communicated sensation, feeling, or whatever else we 
might think of in an immediate encounter with the 
world. This may well mean that such a “thought” is not a 
conscious one, that it is, so to speak, not even communi-
cated to ourselves. Though there are interesting and diffi-
cult questions to be pursued here, this paper attempts 
solely to flesh out Nietzsche’s positions on language and 
will leave the precise nature of “thought” largely untreat-
ed. 
ii. I will be using “the individual” more or less interchange-
ably with personal “thought,” an equation the reasons 
for which should become clear. 
iii. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, et al. The Gay Science : 
with a Prelude In German Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
2001. §354, On ‘the genius of the species’. 
iv. Ibid. 
v. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and R. J Hollingdale. Hu-
man, All Too Human. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. Part 1, §11. 
vi. Ibid. 
vii. Nietzsche, Friedrich. "On truth and lies in a nonmoral 
sense." Philosophy and truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s 
notebooks of the early 1870s (1979): 79-97. §1. 
viii. Ibid., §1. 
ix. Ibid., §2. 
x. Ibid., §2. 
xi. In particular, the later writings of Nietzsche in which his 
voice has evolved and he approaches literary as opposed 
to traditional philosophical prose. 
xii. Nietzsche, Friedrich W, and Walter A. Kaufmann. Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. New York: 




xiii. See Schopenhauer as Educator, §§1 and 7, for example. 
His idea of the exemplar—a figure to surpass, not to 
merely emulate—is comparable to the role of Zarathustra 
here.  
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